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A PLACE FOR INTERPOSITION?  WHAT JOHN TAYLOR OF
CAROLINE AND THE EMBARGO CRISIS HAVE TO OFFER
REGARDING RESISTANCE TO THE BUSH CONSTITUTION
BRADLEY D. HAYS*
Over the past decade, significant attention has been given to the
study of constitutional shortcomings and failures.  For example, a
group of highly prestigious scholars recently detailed a laundry list of
the deficiencies that they believe plague the American Constitution.1
Scholars such as Mark Brandon and Mark Graber have extensively
studied the degree to which the United States Constitution has failed
to provide an operative political system and the impact of that consti-
tutional failure on American political development.2  Much of this
scholarship has concentrated on the nineteenth century, particularly
the period leading up to and immediately following the Civil War.
However, increasingly scholars have begun to examine constitutional
failure in light of contemporary politics and political values.  Sanford
Levinson’s recent book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, discusses the de-
gree to which the United States Constitution is “grievously flawed,”
failing to constitute a truly democratic political order and, thereby,
failing to realize many of our most important political and social val-
ues.3  Levinson hopes “[t]o convince you that you should join [him]
in supporting the call for a new constitutional convention.”4  How-
ever, Levinson readily acknowledges one of the most significant obsta-
cles that stand in the way of constitutional reform: Americans venerate
Copyright  2007 by Bradley D. Hays.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada Las
Vegas.  Special thanks to Mark A. Graber for the initial invitation to write the piece and his
subsequent encouragement.  Additional thanks to Don Mirjanian for his thoughtful com-
ments and edits.
1. See CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (asking several prominent constitutional law scholars
for their opinion on what is the “stupidest” constitutional provision and cataloguing the
responses).
2. See MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE, at ix (1998) (discussing the “breakdown of constitutional order in the United
States in the nineteenth century,” specifically with regard to the institution of slavery);
MARK A. GRABER, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil 2 (2006) (describing the
development of “constitutional evil” in the context of slavery and the Dredd Scott decision).
3. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
4. Id. at 9.
200
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their Constitution.5  The degree to which Americans are socialized to
revere the Constitution creates a significant obstacle to constitutional
reform insofar as reform requires Americans to admit that the vener-
able Constitution is fundamentally flawed.6  Past constitutional re-
formers have found the American civic religion too great a cultural
barrier—and the strictures of Article V too great a burden—to
achieve even minor constitutional reform.7
Two concerns seem to dominate the work of Levinson and other
progressive reformers: (1) the democratic deficit in most national in-
stitutions,8 and (2) the threat to civil liberties posed by a “too powerful
president.”9  However, given the improbability of significant constitu-
tional reform, it is worth considering what options are available to en-
hance democratic practice and protect civil liberties jeopardized by
executive power.  In this Essay, I turn to early American constitutional-
ism as a source for achieving the aspirations of constitutional reform-
ers, if not altering existing institutions.  Specifically, I argue that state
interposition, as theorized by John Taylor of Caroline and practiced
by several New England states during the Embargo Crisis of 1808–09,
affords constitutional resources that can enhance democratic practice
and provide greater civil libertarian protection from executive
authority.10
In its original formulation, state interposition was fashioned as a
means of protecting national popular majorities against executive au-
thority.  The advent of “party spirit” in the early-nineteenth century
reduced the efficacy of Madisonian separation of powers.11  When
party loyalty trumps institutional prerogative, consolidation of power
under one department of government is much more likely.  Early con-
stitutional thinkers and political officials, faced with both the threat
and actual aggrandizement of power in the executive, moved to
5. See id. at 16–17 (noting that Americans “venerate the Constitution and find the
notion of seriously criticizing it almost sacrilegious”).
6. Id.
7. See id. at 160 (arguing that Article V “works to make practically impossible needed
changes in our polity”); see also Alan Gibson, Desacralizing the Constitution, 65 REV. POL. 131
(2003) (reviewing ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2002)) (stating that Americans’ reverence of the Constitution “makes amending the docu-
ment—difficult enough through procedures set forth in it—even more difficult”).
8. See LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 6 (“I have become ever more despondent about many R
structural provisions of the Constitution that place almost insurmountable barriers in the
way of any acceptable notion of democracy.”).
9. Id. at 79.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2312–13 (2006).
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counteract this development by theorizing a greater place for state
governments in constitutional politics.12
In the early American Republic, state governments were a vibrant
source of constitutional innovation.  State governments and political
actors exposited constitutional norms in an effort to define the new
constitutional order.13  Unfortunately, much of that tradition came to
be associated with Southern illiberalism and the maintenance of as-
criptive hierarchy.14  However, federalism is an empty normative shell
and neither need be, nor was it always, associated exclusively with the
maintenance of white supremacy.  During the Jefferson Administra-
tion, northeastern states asserted their authority to interpret the Con-
stitution as a means of critiquing abusive executive power.15  State-
driven constitutionalism provided an important critique of executive
power on constitutional grounds (criticism largely absent today) and
resulted in important constraints on power and policy changes.16
This Essay begins by briefly exploring the political theory of John
Taylor of Caroline.17  Taylor was the father of interposition but is gen-
erally omitted from the canon of great political thinkers of antebel-
lum America.18  Taylor’s theories address several of the most pressing
constitutional concerns in post-September 11th America.19  Next, I
provide a brief account of the embargo crisis that occurred at the end
of Jefferson’s presidency.20  States in the northeastern portion of the
country responded aggressively to Jefferson’s innovative and suspect
enforcement authority.  State level responses helped limit Jeffersonian
authority and mobilize the people against policies deemed illegitimate
and constitutionally suspect. Finally, I conclude by making some tenta-
tive suggestions regarding the benefits of a constitutionalism that rein-
corporates the interpretive authority of state level institutions and
12. See infra Part II.
13. See Keith E. Whittington, The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America:
The Nullification Debate as an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change, 26
PUBLIUS 1, 3–5 (1996) (discussing the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which declared
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 unconstitutional, and the role of the states as constitu-
tional interpreters and “guardians against the general government”).
14. See generally JOHN C. CALHOUN, DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (C. Gordon Post ed.,
1995).
15. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. R
16. See infra notes 106–111 and accompanying text. R
17. See infra Parts I–II.
18. See, e.g., AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Kenneth M. Dolbeare & Michael S. Cum-
mings eds., 2004) (omitting Taylor in cataloguing and discussing influential American po-
litical thinkers); THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Jeffrey L. Prewitt ed.,
1996) (same).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part III.
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actors.21  Essentially, I describe a “thin” version of interposition tied to
constitutional politics and national majorities that provides an institu-
tional alternative to the present constitutional interpretive regime.
I. ROOTS OF INTERPOSITION
The rise of nascent political parties created numerous problems
for early American political thinkers and actors.  If party spirit under-
cut the system of separation of powers, what would protect against an
illegitimate combination of powers under one branch of government?
Similarly, if party spirit extended to the electorate, what would pre-
vent political minorities from winning national office and creating
public policy inconsistent with majority preferences?  John Taylor of
Caroline was one such political thinker in the early nineteenth cen-
tury who feared that a factious minority would gain control over the
national government to the detriment of the people’s liberty.22  To
Taylor, Federalist economic policy of the 1790s indicated that re-
gional-based coalitions could successfully control national policy to
the detriment of the general welfare.23  The central question, then,
was how to protect liberty and the general welfare when a factious
minority held power?
Whereas Madison believed that any ruling cabal could be fac-
tious,24 Taylor argued that majorities could never be factious as the
majority were the people and, thus, majoritarian policymaking defined
the general welfare.25  Taylor claimed that “[t]he force of self love, is
as strong in majorities, as in an individual, but its effect is precisely
contrary.  It excites one man to do wrong, because he is surrounded
with objects of oppression; and majorities to do right, because they
can find none.”26  The key to legitimacy in government was to ensure
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 96 (W. Stark ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1950) (1814) (“[A]n
individual or minority will be infinitely more likely to oppress a nation for self-gratification,
than a nation, for the same end, to oppress an individual or minority.”) [hereinafter AN
INQUIRY].
23. See EUGENE TENBROECK MUDGE, THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CARO-
LINE 145–46 (AMS Press 1968) (1939); see also AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 477–92. R
24. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(defining a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community”).
25. AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 482; see also C. WILLIAM HILL, JR., THE POLITICAL THE- R
ORY OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE 84–85 (1977) (comparing and contrasting Madison’s
definition of “faction” with Taylor’s).
26. AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 389. R
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that the majority would always guide national policy making.27  How-
ever, Taylor lacked faith in the newly constituted selection methods.28
Should national elections fail to achieve a government representative
of the people, factious government could assert inappropriate prerog-
ative over national policy-making.29  Of gravest concern, factious par-
ties could render interpretations of the Constitution inconsistent with
the general will and trammel the authority of resisting political
institutions.30
To protect the majority from factious oppression, Taylor theo-
rized a role for state governments in constitutional politics that would
afford the people greater civil libertarian protection.  First, when the
national government or one of its departments illegitimately en-
croached upon the liberties of the people, the state could interpose
itself between the tyrannical national government and its citizens.31
Second, states could serve as catalysts for action and a conduit
through which the people could form organized resistance.32  Despite
calling on states for an important role in constitutional politics, Taylor
believed that state interposition would occur rarely33 and only in con-
stitutional controversies.34  When the mechanisms of selecting national
officeholders worked properly, the national government would legis-
27. See MUDGE, supra note 23, at 95–97; see also JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTI- R
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1971) (1823) [herein-
after NEW VIEWS].
28. See HILL, supra note 25, at 159–60 (“Taylor had serious doubts about the efficacy of R
elections, even when used along with separated powers, as in the United States, to preserve
liberty.”).
29. Id. at 157–58.
30. See AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 174–75 (discussing how election and division of R
power must be used together to ensure that executive power is consistent with the public
will, rather than the interests of any particular faction).
31. See NEW VIEWS, supra note 27, at 133 (asserting that a usurpation by Congress of the R
Constitution can only “be prevented by . . . a concurrent power in the state and federal
governments to construe and preserve the constitution”); see also HILL, supra note 25, at R
225–26.
32. See HILL, supra note 25, at 187 (“The existence of states gave the people regular R
channels for influencing the public affairs and governmental structure of the union, while
the state governments allowed the population within each state an outlet for their frustra-
tions.”); see also NEW VIEWS, supra note 27, at 187 (arguing that the state governments pro- R
vide an “orderly and organized” check on the power of the federal government, without
which the people would not be “sufficiently able and willing to act in concert”).
33. Taylor believed interposition was the last resort and “earnestly hope[d] that the
ever-to-be-avoided contest [between state and national governments would] never occur.”
JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 156 (1820)
[hereinafter CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED].
34. Taylor tied state interposition to alterations to the constitutional order. NEW
VIEWS, supra note 27, at 70–71. Taylor believed that state “[o]pposition must . . . be consti- R
tutional.”  Id. at 71.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR112.txt unknown Seq: 6 11-DEC-07 13:55
2007] A PLACE FOR INTERPOSITION? 205
late consistent with the general welfare.  However, when selection
mechanisms failed to produce a regime in step with the polity and the
regime attempted to instill a new constitutional order that harmed the
people’s liberty, states could and should act to interpose themselves to
prevent harm befalling their citizens.35  Thus, normal politics should
take its due course but structural changes to the distribution of power
in the national government would meet with state action to protect
states’ citizenry.
Taylor argued that state governmental protection was necessary
due to the relative ease with which a factious coalition—united by
party spirit—could alter the political and constitutional order.36  Be-
cause the national departments of government could be unified by
partisanship, thereby undermining Madisonian separation of powers,
another layer of protection was needed to protect citizen liberty.37
State governments were detached from national partisan spirit and
could better resist their impulses.38  The capacity to resist partisanship
was intertwined with the obligation of states to interpret the Constitu-
tion.  To Taylor, constitutional interpretation was a concurrent power
shared by all political institutions.39  State governments were obliged
to interpret the Constitution in ways consistent with the general wel-
fare and the liberty of its citizenry.  When the interpretation of the
national government unsettled the national constitutional order,
states were obliged to voice their dissent in the name of the people.40
When a factious national government attempted to alter the con-
stitutional order, states intervened by declaring what one scholar of
Taylor described as “declarations of disagreement.”41  The point of
these declarations was not to nullify the policy in question.  Rather,
public declarations of disagreement made states the focal point of po-
litical resistance to national policies.42  By refusing to capitulate to the
35. Id.
36. AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 560–62. R
37. NEW VIEWS, supra note 26, at 76–77. R
38. See, e.g., AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 104–05 (stating that “among several hundred R
state governours [sic] who have already existed, not one instance has appeared of kingly
qualities, of usurpation, or of war between neighbouring states”).
39. Joseph R. Stromberg, Country Ideology, Republicanism, and Libertarianism: The Thought
of John Taylor of Caroline, 6 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 35, 42 (1982); see also CONSTRUCTION CON-
STRUED, supra note 33, at 49–50. R
40. NEW VIEWS, supra note 27, at 70; see also HILL, supra note 25, at 207 (“If Congress R
passed a law that was unconstitutional in a state’s judgment, that state must refuse to obey
the law.”).
41. HILL, supra note 25, at 232. R
42. See id. at 225–29 (discussing Taylor’s views on state interposition and arguing that
Taylor disfavored a doctrine of nullification in favor of a process of “responsive
amend[ment]”).
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constitutional innovation at issue, a state placed itself between the op-
pressor and the citizen.  Taylor did not rest the merits of interposition
on the efficacy of abating national enforcement of the questionable
policy.43  Rather, he believed that states would serve as the foci for
mobilization against the illegitimate policy.  Taylor had little faith that
the people alone could resist federal encroachment.44  Worse, action
by the people themselves often was mobbish and lawless.45  The peo-
ple lacked the necessary organization for proper (and peaceful) resis-
tance and popular movements were susceptible to executive
persuasion.46  The latter point also fueled Taylor’s suspicion of execu-
tive authority.  Taylor argued the President could use his or her spe-
cial access to information regarding military and foreign affairs to
deflate resistance to executive policies.47  Since popular movements
were so vulnerable, state governments were needed to act on behalf of
the people.
Of course, state resistance to national constitutional re-interpreta-
tion begs the question: to what end?  Taylor acknowledged federal
supremacy, rejected nullification, and dreaded civil war.48  So what
would state interposition accomplish?  Taylor indicated two objectives
to be achieved through interposition.  First, state resistance creates a
form of gridlock that slows the suspect policy’s enforcement.  Second,
through the declaration of disagreement, the resisting state provides a
constitutional alternative to the one promulgated by the national gov-
ernment.49  Taylor believed that there was a natural affinity between
the people and their state governments that could trump the persua-
sive force of the executive.  Whereas the people could not properly
mobilize to protect themselves, the people could be trusted as the ulti-
mate arbiter of constitutional controversies provided they had a
choice.50  With states protecting against national oppression, the peo-
ple would have the time necessary to express their preference through
43. See id. at 227 (stating that resistance by the states did not nullify the federal law); see
also NEW VIEWS, supra note 27, at 70–71, 255–56. R
44. NEW VIEWS, supra note 27, at 187–88, 257–59. R
45. Id. at 186–88.
46. Id.
47. See AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 183–84 (arguing that, although elected democrati- R
cally, the breadth of executive powers tends to tempt executives to act like monarchs).
48. See generally HILL, supra note 23, at 216–33. R
49. Id. at 227.  For example, as discussed below, New England states provided a consti-
tutional alternative to Jeffersonian policies during the Embargo Crisis and their position
helped concretize popular resistance. See infra Part III.
50. See Stromberg, supra note 39, at 42 (noting that Taylor believed that “ultimate sov- R
ereignty resides in the people” of the states, and that state interposition allowed them a
means by which to assert that right).
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the ballot51 or through the constitutional amendment process.  Tay-
lor’s faith in elections as the appropriate mechanism for resolving
constitutional conflicts echoes his belief that state interposition was
essentially majoritarian in nature.
II. INTERPOSITION AND EXECUTIVE POWER
As noted above, Taylor expressed particular concern over aggran-
dizement of power in the executive.52  More than any other institu-
tion, Taylor believed that the Framers erred by instilling the President
with authority too great for one individual to wield: “The presidency,
gilded with kingly powers, has been tossed into the constitution,
against the publick [sic] sentiment, and gravely bound in didactick
[sic] fetters, like those which in England and France have become
political old junk.”53  The problems of a single executive were aggra-
vated by the rise of party spirit, which helped loyalty to the administra-
tion trump both institutional prerogative and public virtue.  In
Taylor’s opinion, factious government led to unconstitutional
government.54
While Taylor expressed concern over many facets of executive
power, nowhere was the problem more acute than in the executive’s
war powers.  With the ability of the President to use the party system,
Taylor worried that a small number of party members could arrive at a
decision that would plunge the nation into war.55  Dividing the war
powers between Congress and the presidency did little to prevent in-
appropriate military action if members of Congress were more loyal to
the President than their own institution.56  According to Taylor, war
motivated by factious interest would violate the principles upon which
the Constitution was founded.57  He seemed particularly concerned
that war could be used to “wag the dog” even when the action was
unpopular among the masses.58  War would always be profitable
51. Taylor’s faith in elections is surprising given his concern that electoral mechanisms
could bring a faction to power.  However, Taylor seems to see such occurrences as anoma-
lies that must be weathered by prohibiting the faction from doing grave damage to the
Union. AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 174–75. R
52. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
53. AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 174–75. R
54. See MUDGE, supra note 23, at 105; see also AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 560–62. R
55. See AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 172–73. R
56. Id. at 193–94.
57. See MUDGE, supra note 23, at 110 (explaining that Taylor argued that “the war policy R
is defective in that the decision to wage a war is ‘unsubjected to public opinion.’  By his
monopoly of military patronage and power of secret negotiation the president may resort
to war to extend his personal power”).
58. Id. at 109–10.
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among certain elites and loyal citizens who tend, at least in the short
run, to rally around the administration.  Thus, executive war powers,
“unsubjected to public opinion,” could be used to advance presiden-
tial ambitions and prop up vulnerable office holders.59
However, if properly enabled, the people could see through such
misdirection.  Taylor argued that “ ‘[w]ar, to rally the people round
the government’ was . . . but a shallow device.”60  In his opinion, states
could expose how executive policy harmed the liberties of the people
and provide the leadership and resistance necessary for the people to
express their opposition.  Expression would come through the demo-
cratic process.  A sufficient number of elections would result in either
successful removal of the factious government from office or, in the
case of poorly functioning methods of selection, constitutional
amendment that would remedy the institutional evil resulting in fac-
tious government.  Either way, state interposition would provide some
measure of protection of liberty while the popular groundswell was
building.
The current state of politics leads one to believe that many of
Taylor’s concerns have come home to roost.  Executive ambitions
have led to sweeping exercise of the war powers.61  The President’s
position in the party enabled the administration to overcome congres-
sional resistance to policies that reduce civil libertarian protections.62
True to Taylor’s speculation, the American people rallied around the
administration and its claims to special information regarding na-
tional security.63  New innovative policies altered the pre-existing con-
stitutional order in such a way as to centralize surveillance and
detention authority.64
Yet, neither the courts nor the legislature offered any real resis-
tance to administration policies and, perhaps more notably, Ameri-
cans hold few expectations that states should act as countervailing
bodies.
59. Id.
60. John Taylor, John Taylor to Thomas Ritchie, THE ENQUIRER, Mar. 14, 1809, at 4.
61. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 517–20
(2006) (discussing the enhancement of presidential power under the administration of
George W. Bush).
62. See Rick Klein, Senate’s Passage of Detainee Bill Gives Bush a Win, B. GLOBE, Sept. 29,
2006, at A1 (detailing recent congressional measures arguably representing a serious cur-
tailment of civil rights, and the partisan backdrop that allowed for the success of the
measures).
63. Id.
64. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 61, at 520–25 (discussing the transformation of R
the United States into a “National Surveillance State”).
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But such was not always the case.  New England states acted in
ways consistent with Taylorian interposition during the Embargo Cri-
sis of 1808–09.65  During the Jefferson Administration, several New
England states responded to the national Embargo and coinciding
Force Acts by resisting full enforcement of the embargo and publicly
declaring their belief that several embargo measures (the fourth Em-
bargo Act in particular) were unconstitutional.  The effect was to limit
the impact of Jefferson’s policies and to institutionalize resistance to
policies of contested constitutional legitimacy.66
III. THE EMBARGO AND INTERPOSITION
By 1807, war between England and France began to take a major
toll on the commerce of the United States.67  Squeezed between Na-
poleon’s Continental System and England’s Order in Council, U.S.
merchant vessels were regularly boarded, their freight seized, and
their sailors impressed into foreign service.68  Such events came to a
head when the British navy attacked the American merchant frigate
Chesapeake.69  Less than two weeks later, President Thomas Jefferson
described the events, stating:
And at length a deed, transcending all we have suffered,
brings the public sensibility to a serious crisis, and forbear-
ance to a necessary pause.  A frigate of the US. [sic] trusting
to a state of peace and leaving her harbor on a distant ser-
vice, has been surprised and attacked by a British vessel of
superior force, one of a squadron then lying in our waters to
cover the transaction, & has been disabled from service with
the loss of a number of men killed & wounded.  This enor-
mity was not only without provocation or justifiable cause;
but was committed with the avowed purpose of taking by
force from a ship of war of the US. [sic] a part of her crew:
and that no circumstance might be wanting to make its char-
65. See infra Part III.
66. See infra Part III.
67. See John D. Forbes, European Wars and Boston Trade, 1783–1815, 11 NEW ENG. Q.
709, 722–23 (1938) (discussing the “disastrous” effect of the conflict on the American ship-
ping industry).
68. See Thomas Jefferson, Special Message on Commercial Depredations, in 10 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 530–31 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905) (discussing the “great and
increasing dangers” to American vessels, seamen, and merchandise as a result of the Euro-
pean conflict).
69. See LOUIS MARTIN SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE EMBARGO 28 (1966) (“Any lingering
dreams of overtures to Great Britain were rudely shattered by the Chesapeake outrage.”).
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acter, the commander was apprised that the seamen thus for-
cibly . . . were native citizens of the US. [sic]70
Public outcry demanded action and the action demanded was
war.71  Jefferson steered a course intended to keep the United States
out of war but, in so doing, he exercised unprecedented powers as the
commander in chief, notably using the military for domestic law
enforcement.
Jefferson realized that direct confrontation with either France or
England would lead to a U.S. defeat.72  The American military was not
in a position to take on either the British navy or French land forces,
so Jefferson advocated economic warfare that would bring great pres-
sure to bear on both countries, particularly England.73  Jefferson be-
lieved economic embargo would be a new form of warfare that could
swiftly demoralize the English and alter their willful antagonizing of
American merchant ships.74  However, a successful embargo would
mean eliminating all forms of international trade, which, in turn,
would cause significant financial harm to the U.S. as well, with dispro-
portionate harm to the merchant class of the northeast.  Creating in-
ternational economic turmoil would require near-total compliance
with the embargo and to achieve this end Jefferson demanded en-
forcement authority that bent the Constitution to his will.75
Within approximately four months of the embargo, Congress
passed three enforcement laws at Jefferson’s request.76  In each case,
the measures were passed with extraordinary rapidity due to “the op-
eration of the Democratic-Republican machine,”77 even to the point
where the Senate suspended its requirement to read a bill three times
70. Thomas Jefferson, Chesapeake Proclamation, in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 68, at 441–44. R
71. See SEARS, supra note 69, at 29 (explaining how a “war spirit” spread through the R
country after the attack).
72. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Kaplan, Jefferson, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Balance of Power, 14
WM. & MARY Q. 196, 197 (1957) (noting that Jefferson “indicated through his embargo
program that he understood the risks a small power would run in entangling itself in Euro-
pean wars”).
73. See SEARS, supra note 69, at 3, 55–60 (noting Jefferson’s view that a fight on the seas R
with England or a land fight with France were “quixotic” courses, and discussing Jefferson’s
reasoning in deciding to recommend to Congress the imposition of an embargo).  In let-
ters to Barnabas Bidwell, John Page, and William Duane, Jefferson noted that the United
States needed time to prepare for war, and that efforts that would prolong the start of war
would work to the benefit of the United States.  9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 68, at 106–07, 119, 120. R
74. Kaplan, supra note 72, at 201. R
75. LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 101–02 (1963).
76. Id. at 96–103.
77. SEARS, supra note 69, at 60. R
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on three separate days to pass the first embargo bill in a matter of
hours.78  Numerous (Federalist) legislators complained about the lack
of information coming from the administration, claiming that this
hampered congressional deliberations.79  Rep. Barent Gardenier (NY)
claimed, “Darkness and mystery overshadow the House and this whole
nation.  We know nothing, we are permitted to know nothing.  We sit
here as mere automata; we legislate without knowing, nay, sir, without
wishing to know, why or wherefore.  We are told what we are to do,
and . . . do it.”80  Officeholders from the northeast also complained of
the embargo’s suspect constitutionality.  Speaking from the floor of
the House, Josiah Quincy (MA) noted the lack of express constitu-
tional authorization for the embargo and asserted, “It was impossible
that the Framers of the Constitution should presume that a power
would be exercised which should exceed any exercised by the most
despotic Governments in the world.”81  Each Embargo Act contained
provisions that arguably pushed the constitutional envelope, particu-
larly as it pertained to executive authority, but it was the fourth Act
that ran so far afoul of the Constitution as to push New England states
to interposition.82
The fourth Embargo Act, authored by Jefferson and Secretary of
the Treasury Albert Gallatin,83 contained two provisions of dubious
constitutionality.  Section six of the fourth Embargo Act declared:
no ship or vessel having any cargo whatever on board,
shall . . . be allowed to depart from any port of the United
States, for any other port or district of the United States, ad-
jacent to the territories, colonies, or provinces of a foreign
nation . . . without special permission of the President of the
United States.84
Jefferson’s belief that the national government’s commercial reg-
ulatory power included the power to prohibit commerce was far from
established.  As Leonard Levy noted, “the power to regulate com-
merce had never been considered as an authority to prohibit it alto-
gether.”85  The provision had the dual effect of crippling commerce
along the Canadian border and consolidating executive control over
78. LEVY, supra note 75, at 96. R
79. Id. at 98–99.
80. 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 1656 (1808).
81. Id. at 2076.
82. LEVY, supra note 75, at 101–02. R
83. All four embargo enforcement acts originated with the administration and were
passed by Congress with few substantive changes. Id. at 96–103.
84. Act of April 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 6, 2 Stat. 499, 500.
85. LEVY, supra note 75, at 101. R
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commercial activity throughout the northeast.86  In response, New En-
glanders asserted a right to engage in commercial activity and deemed
the blanket prohibition unconstitutional.87  Commercial merchants in
the northeast chaffed, in particular, at the provision that required
merchant ships to receive “special permission” from Jefferson, which
consolidated power in the executive to a degree that, Federalists ar-
gued, violated the allocation of powers within the constitutional
system.88
The enforcement mechanism in the fourth Embargo Act also
raised serious constitutional concerns.  Section seven declared
the public armed vessels and gun boats of the United States
shall, as well as the commanders or masters of the revenue
cutters, and revenue boats, be authorized, and they are
hereby authorized to stop and examine any vessel, flat, or
boat, belonging to any citizen of the United States, either on
the high seas, or within the jurisdiction of the United States,
or any foreign vessel within the jurisdiction of the United
States, which there may be reason to suspect to be engaged
in any traffic or commerce, or in the transportation of mer-
chandise . . . contrary to the provisions of this act . . . .89
For the first time, the United States armed forces would be used
for the purposes of domestic law enforcement against its own citi-
zens.90  In essence, Jefferson turned his commander-in-chief powers
inward in a way unanticipated in the absence of insurrection.91  Yet,
the matter was never seriously discussed in Congress, and Jefferson
never explained his rationale for requesting the power.92
A secondary problem arose out of the authorization to search ves-
sels upon mere suspicion.  One modern Jeffersonian critic argues that
the provision conflicted with the language of the Fourth Amendment
86. See SEARS, supra note 69, at 145 (“The embargo shook to its foundations the entire R
economic structure of New England.”).
87. For example, the Boston Gazette published a vigorous critique that labeled Jeffer-
son administration policies as “oppressive” and “originate[d] in imperfect conceptions of
the interests of the whole.” B. GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1809, at 1.
88. See SEARS, supra note 69, at 175 (chronicling public outcry at the new law). R
89. Act of April 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 6, 2 Stat. 499, 501.
90. See LEVY, supra note 75, at 109 (noting that “it was a new departure in American R
history to send the navy into action, on a daily basis, not against a foreign enemy, but
against American citizens”).
91. Id. at 102 (stating that the fourth Embargo Act “carried the Administration to the
precipice of unlimited and arbitrary power as measured by any American standard then
known”).
92. Id. at 101–02 (noting that the “special constitutional problems,” raised by the
fourth Embargo Act “were not discussed either by the President or Congress”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR112.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-DEC-07 13:55
2007] A PLACE FOR INTERPOSITION? 213
as it eliminated a need for either probable cause or a warrant.93  How-
ever, public objections to the embargo never cited the Fourth Amend-
ment even as they complained about the tyrannical nature of the
provision.94  Rather, complaints centered on how the provision ag-
grandized power in the executive and how it trampled upon the com-
mercial liberties of the American people.95  A northern reading of the
Constitution made commercialism central to constitutional protection
and, as a consequence, Jeffersonian policies violated the Constitu-
tion.96  Such an understanding of the Constitution could not stand,
and northeastern lawmakers soon threatened action to protect against
further intrusion.97  However, Federalists in the House and Senate did
not enjoy sufficient numbers to counter Jefferson’s authority.98  This
meant that resistance needed to come from the affected states.
Consistent with Taylor’s theory of interposition, several New En-
gland states declared their disagreement over the constitutionality of
the Embargo and subsequent Force Acts.99  Yet, also consistent with
Taylor’s theory, these objections were pro-union and constitutional in
nature.  Harrison Gray Otis, a member of the famed Essex Junto and
Massachusetts state legislator, suggested a conference “for the pur-
pose of providing some mode of relief that may not be inconsistent with
the union of these states.”100  Rather than a special convention, the Mas-
sachusetts House of Representatives moved against Jefferson by pass-
ing a report that condemned the fourth Embargo Act and declared it
“in many respects unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not le-
gally binding on the citizens of this State.”101
93. Id. at 102–05.
94. Thomas Y. Davies argues that the framing generation understood the Fourth
Amendment as limited in scope.  The Fourth Amendment protected the home and per-
sonal effects only and did not apply to commercial structures and vessels. See Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 714 (1999).
95. LEVY, supra note 75, at 105–06; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text. R
96. As Louis Martin Sears noted, the debates in Congress may have been the early
formation of American laissez-faire economic policy.  If nothing else, this policy won many
devotees in New England during 1807–1808. See SEARS, supra note 69, at 160. R
97. For example, Massachusetts instructed its delegates to Congress to repeal the em-
bargo laws because “their effects are becoming daily and palpably more injurious.”  1 AMER-
ICAN STATE PAPERS, 728 (1808).
98. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 263 (3d ed. 1994).
99. SEARS, supra note 69, at 143–49. R
100. David H. Fischer, The Myth of the Essex Junto, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 191, 232 (1964).
101. See SEARS, supra note 69, at 185 n. 116 (quoting the Report of a Committee of the R
House of Representatives Respecting certain Military Orders issued by His Honor Levi Lin-
coln, Lieutenant Governor, and Commander in Chief of the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts with the Documents referred to in the same).
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The Connecticut General Assembly followed suit by passing a sim-
ilar, if more stringently worded, resolution.  The Assembly noted that
when facing a measure of dubious constitutionality it is
the duty of the legislative and executive authorities in the
State, to withhold their aid, and co-operation, from the exe-
cution of the act . . . .  While it is the duty of the Legislature
to guard the sovereignty of the State, and your rights from
encroachment, it continues to be your interest and duty, as
peaceable citizens, to abstain from all resistance, against acts,
which purport to be laws of the United States.  Be advised to
seek none but constitutional relief.102
Later the same month, the General Assembly passed a special res-
olution that reiterated the unconstitutionality of the Embargo Force
Acts and instructed, “persons holding executive offices under this
State, are restrained by the duties which they owe this State, from af-
fording any official aid or cooperation in the execution of the act
aforesaid.”103  The measure applied equally to the state militia, which
posed a problem for Jefferson’s plan to call forth the militia to supple-
ment the regular army already enforcing the embargo.104
The direct effects of the Massachusetts and Connecticut resolu-
tions are unclear but, in states throughout the northeast, election re-
sults indicate that voters from New York to Maine approved of the
continuing resistance effort.  Federalists picked up twenty-four seats in
the United States House of Representatives, almost all of which came
from states in the northeastern part of the country.105
The combination of state opposition and continued popular re-
sistance to the embargo proved fatal to the policy.  With the unpopu-
larity of the embargo manifesting in declarations of disagreement and
adverse election results, Jeffersonian Republicans in the House and
Senate eagerly supported a less abrasive alternative.106  Jefferson was
equally humbled.  In February of 1809, Congress substituted non-
intercourse for embargo.107  Non-intercourse was so innocuous that it
posed no obstacle to foreign trade and international commerce
102. Id. at 185–86 (quoting an address of the General Assembly to the People of Con-
necticut in 1809).
103. Id. at 186.
104. Id. The special resolution asserted the Assembly’s approval of the Governor’s re-
fusal to allow the aid of military power to enforce the embargo. Id.
105. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 98, at 293. R
106. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Mann Randolph, 11 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 68, at 96 (describing a sudden “revolution of opinion” in the R
House, causing members to vote for removing the embargo).
107. SEARS, supra note 69, at 190. R
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quickly resumed to its pre-embargo levels.108  The anti-embargo re-
sponse that began at the state level and had evolved into national pol-
icy “impos[ed] upon Jefferson the deepest humiliation of his
career.”109
As a matter of policy, the embargo’s end was a clear victory for
the Federalists.110  As a matter of constitutional construction, the Fed-
eralists successfully ended a policy they viewed as tyrannical.  However,
the idea that the national government lacks the power to destroy for-
eign commerce never received authoritative construction.  In fact, the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence years later concre-
tized Jefferson’s take on federal dominion over foreign and interstate
commerce.111  Of course, this represents John Taylor’s point: state in-
terposition did not result in constitutional consensus.  Rather, it pro-
vided the time to create consensus on a contested constitutional
power while minimizing the harm to civil liberties.
IV. NINETEENTH-CENTURY LESSONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Obvious parallels exist between events of the early-nineteenth
century and today.  Jefferson sought and received significant new pow-
ers in the name of fighting a new war.112 Rather than thoughtful delib-
eration on the new powers and their relation to existing allocation of
powers, party spirit motivated Congress to approve unprecedented
and constitutionally questionable powers to the executive branch.113
Jefferson also turned the war powers inward, not to quell insurrection
or rebellion, but to enforce the terms of the new war.114  Despite sig-
nificant congressional majorities, there were reasons to doubt the
majoritarian nature of these policies.  The Constitution clearly allot-
ted legislative representation not necessarily reflective of majoritarian-
ism and, in the case of embargo, the country’s (free) population
centers were predominantly in areas of the country that opposed
embargo.115
108. Id. at 194.
109. Id. at 190.
110. See id. at 195.
111. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196–97 (1824) (holding that Congress’s power to
regulate “commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States” is plenary).
112. See AN INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 189 (discussing the dangers of excessive executive R
power).
113. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. R
114. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. R
115. According to 1810 census data, the free population in the mid-Atlantic and north-
eastern states was approximately 1,268,761 while the free population in the South was
650,601.  (The total population in the South was 1,047,296).  Census Data for Year 1810,
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Recently, the Bush Administration claimed (and received) signifi-
cant new authority to fight the War on Terror.116  Congress’s super-
ficial debates turned more on party spirit than substantive
constitutional discourse.117  The resulting policies have utilized exec-
utive power to combat the War on Terror in ways that directly tram-
mel the liberties of U.S. citizens.118  These policies have been
promulgated by an administration that came to power absent a na-
tional majority and bolstered by an arguably undemocratic Senate and
malapportioned House.119  This is not to say that the American peo-
ple have univocally expressed displeasure with administration policies
at the polls.120  However, the people have been offered few alterna-
tives to current policy.  The lack of options reflects a major difference
between early-nineteenth-century resistance and events nearly two
centuries later.
Taylor warned that the people themselves were not a viable
source for resistance to the persuasive effect of the national exec-
utive.121  The unique position of the President in public life as head of
state and head of the executive would have great persuasive effect on
the people.122  The people alone could not be expected to see
through executive deception.  Taylor likely overstated the ineptitude
University of Virginia, Geospacial and Statistical Data Center, http://fisher.lib.virginia.
edu/collections/stats/histcensus/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
116. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 70, at 518; see also, e.g., Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the President “to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States”).
117. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 62 (noting that Senate debates centered more on parti- R
san politics than the constitutionality or advisability of the Act).
118. See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SANCTIONED BIAS: RACIAL PROFILING
SINCE 9/11 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/racial%20profiling%20re-
port.pdf; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
(2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf; Report, Wit-
ness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses Under the Material Witness Law Since Sept. 11, 17 HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 1 (2005).
119. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 50–52. R
120. The Republican Party carried both the 2002 congressional election and the 2004
presidential and congressional elections.  Gary C. Jacobson, Polarized Politics and the 2004
Congressional and Presidential Elections, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 199, 200 (2005).
121. See NEW VIEWS, supra note 27, at 187 (“To talk . . . of an American people, as suffi- R
ciently able and willing to act in concert, so as to furnish a security against the effects of a
supreme concentrated power . . . to my mind conveys the idea of great ignorance or of
great ambition.”); see also Hill, supra note 25, at 226 (noting Taylor’s lack of faith in the R
people’s ability to effectively mobilize).
122. MUDGE, supra note 23, at 103–04. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR112.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-DEC-07 13:55
2007] A PLACE FOR INTERPOSITION? 217
of the people.123  However, dissent undoubtedly gains traction when
powerful political actors and institutions take resonant positions.  Or
conversely, dissent concretizes when respected officials articulate al-
ternative positions.  The Bush Administration’s interpretive author-
ity124 is notable given the absence of executive interpretive dominion
in early-nineteenth-century politics.
What this suggests is the absence of a once robust constitutional
tradition.  States have played an inconsequential role in constitutional
interpretation in the post-September 11th world even as the federal
government has moved against liberties state constitutions explicitly
protect.125  Most recently, Section 7 of the Military Commission Act of
2006 prohibited courts from hearing “an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United
States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determi-
nation.”126  Every state constitution (and that of Washington, D.C.)
contains a prohibition against suspending the writ of habeas corpus
“except in cases of rebellion or invasion,” and none of them qualify
this in relation to citizenship.127  Six states contain absolute prohibi-
tions on suspension of the Great Writ.128  Policies of the Bush Admin-
istration directly challenge the rights and privileges articulated in
123. The people were a vigorous source of constitutional discourse in early America. See
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (2004).
124. See generally Charlie Savage, Bush challenges hundreds of laws: President cites powers of his
office, B. GLOBE, April 30, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_laws/; Bob Egelko, How Bush Sidesteps Intent of
Congress, S. F. CHRON., May 7, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?
file=/c/a/2006/05/07/MNGELIN29G1.DTL.
125. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (2004) (noting that although there
has been some state and local opposition to federal policies, “[i]n the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases . . . we can expect [state] cooperation to be forthcoming).
126. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635
(2006).
127. State constitutions can be found at http://www.findlaw.com/11stategov/index
const.html and  http://www.constitution.org/cons/usstcons.htm.  (last visited Nov. 19,
2007).
128. Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas do not pro-
vide exceptions to the protection of habeas corpus.  Louisiana and North Carolina provide
that the writ “shall not be suspended,” LA. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 21, and
Missouri, Montana, and Texas provide the writ “shall never be suspended.” MO. CONST.
art. I, § 12; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 19; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12.  Oklahoma’s Constitution
states that the writ “shall never be suspended by the authorities of this state.” OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 10.
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both state and national constitutions.  For those seeking a voice of
resistance, states can provide such a voice if they recover interposition.
I do not mean to suggest state interposition for the sake of creat-
ing a political quagmire.  Our system is sufficiently inefficient that we
do not need to create greater opposition to change absent a funda-
mental challenge to the principles of constitutional democracy.  How-
ever, when there is (1) a change to the constitutional order to the
detriment of civil liberties, (2) that runs counter to majoritarian pref-
erences, interposition could ensure vigorous debate and a legitimate
constitutional order.  Interposition would be quite limited in that it
could only be used legitimately in rare instances.  However, in those
cases, its value is inestimable.
Interposition is certainly relevant to contemporary politics given
the recent constitutional innovations such as warrantless domestic
eavesdropping, indefinite detention of alleged terrorists, and the sus-
pension of habeas corpus for those deemed unlawful enemy combat-
ants that have diminished civil libertarian protections.  In addition,
administration policies have not enjoyed clear majoritarian support.
In the case of the War on Terror, despite the general support the
administration enjoys for its anti-terror policies (outside of the war in
Iraq), specific, invasive policies do not enjoy nearly the same levels of
support.  A recent CBS News/New York Times poll indicated that
Americans were split on whether “people suspected of involvement in
terrorist attacks against the United States” should be tried by civilian
or military commissions.129  An overwhelming majority (sixty-three
percent) favored following international agreements when it came to
the treatment of “prisoners of war.”130  A USA Today/Gallup poll indi-
cated that fifty-seven percent of Americans believed the CIA should
“abide by the same Geneva Convention standards that apply to the
U.S. military” and should not “be able to use more forceful interroga-
tion techniques than the Geneva Convention.”131  Polling numbers
are not definitive, but they indicate healthy dissent to Bush Adminis-
tration policies that turn on American constitutionalism.  Yet, unlike
in Jeffersonian America, there has been no significant constitutional
response from state institutions.132
129. Forty-nine percent preferred trial in an “open criminal court,” while forty-six per-
cent preferred use of a “closed military court.” PollingReport.com, War on Terror, http://
www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. The lack of constitutional response is interesting given that in areas other than the
War on Terror, states have moved aggressively to either correct Bush administration policy
(e.g., stem cell research), see Paul Elias, Stem Cell Spotlight Falls on California, K. C. STAR, Nov.
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Beyond serving as a source for resistance, interposition shares two
benefits with modern theories of departmentalism.133  First, a thin ver-
sion of interposition spurs constitutional deliberation.  Conflict over
constitutional meaning will require the competing institutions to vie
for the hearts and minds of the polity.  Campaigns to win popular
support will require public discourse.  Likely, the discourse will not
amount to the Webster-Hayne debate,134 but forcing officeholders to
justify and explain constitutional innovations that harm civil liberties
will, at a minimum, create pressures to develop sound reasons for the
policy in question.  This leads to the second benefit: consensus on
constitutional policy.  Deadlock over constitutional policy will be re-
solved but only after one side builds sufficient support either on the
merits or through electoral victories.  Much as the New England states
were able to win anti-embargo support, so too will future parties, insti-
tutions, and governments win support for their constitutional vision.
Interposition is not a guarantee of a strong civil-libertarian regime,
but it holds the promise of greater democratic deliberation.
Finally, interposition provides a benefit quite distinct from theo-
ries of departmentalism.  Departmentalism is largely concerned with
co-equal interpretation at the national level, but unified party control
over the national government renders suspect departmentalism as a
check on abusive authority.135  While interposition does not occur
wholly outside of the American party system, it provides an opportu-
nity for a party out of power at the national level to interject (poten-
tially majoritarian) objections to the party in power’s policy.
Moreover, party ideology at the state level diverges widely from its par-
ent national ideology.136  This is far from a guarantee that states will
act in opposition to the national government, but it changes the in-
centive structure for action by reducing the effects of homogenous
party ideology.
3, 2004, at C1, or force the administration to act where it has chosen not to act (e.g.,
regulation of greenhouse admissions).  Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-1120, 127 S. Ct.
1438, slip. op. at 1–2 (2007).
133. For background on departmentalism, see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994), and
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83
GEO. L.J. 347 (1994).
134. THE WEBSTER-HAYNE DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF THE UNION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS
(Herman Belz ed., 2000).
135. Paulsen, supra note 133, at 225. R
136. Strands of libertarianism, found in both major parties in the non-coastal West, af-
ford both the opportunity and motivation for constitutional dissent.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Essay began by noting that interposition is worth consider-
ing because of the unlikelihood of sweeping constitutional reform. Of
course, the probabilities of rehabilitating interposition are also quite
low.  However, interposition illustrates that vigorous practices existed
in early American constitutionalism that speak to contemporary
problems.  Interposition was theorized to compensate for some of the
same constitutional deficiencies we debate in contemporary
America.137  Modern scholars and activists who wish to find ways to
resist aspects of the twenty-first-century American Constitution will
benefit from considering the merits of bygone constitutional tradi-
tions that helped advance democratic practice while resisting changes
to the constitutional order.
Unfortunately for interposition, advocates for nullification used
interposition theory to justify concurrent majorities.138  Yet, this devel-
opment was contingent upon a system bent on maintaining a constitu-
tional evil.  While many of the institutions that accommodated slavery
still exist,139 the twenty-first-century Constitution does not face the
same pressures that led to nullification.140  A properly tempered ver-
sion of interposition seems viable in modern politics.  In fact, histori-
cal analysis of American political history may reveal a recurrent
tradition akin to interposition.  The Southern Manifesto, written in
response to Brown v. Board of Education,141 appears to be an effort at
state interposition.142  The Southern Manifesto might appear to be ex-
actly the reason why interposition is undesirable.  However, as Michael
Klarman notes, the response of southern states to Brown did more to
marshal public opinion for desegregation than Brown did on its own.
Eventually, when northern whites faced a choice between Brown and
the interposing southern States and the Southern Manifesto, they
chose Brown.143  We may desire a system wherein progressive victories
are realized overnight.  However, the American constitutional order is
not designed to facilitate such change.  As such, we must consider
137. See generally AN INQUIRY, supra note 22. R
138. See generally Calhoun, supra note 14.
139. See generally GRABER, supra note 2. R
140. See generally ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., 1 THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 201–02 (7th ed. 1991) for an examination of those pressures.
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 320 (2004).
143. See id. at 436–37 (explaining how, after the riots in Birmingham in the early 1960s,
Americans believed civil rights was America’s most pressing issue, and most Americans
supported the civil rights movement).
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whether we might be better served by using the institutions we have to
promote democratic dialogue and the protection of civil liberties.
Resisting undesirable changes to the American constitutional or-
der requires creative solutions and early American constitutionalism is
a wellspring.  Careful scrutiny of these constitutional traditions reveals
that they contain democratic resources useful for advancing demo-
cratic practice.  The use of interposition by New England states to
fight Jefferson’s Embargo and the corresponding expansion of execu-
tive power demonstrates that it has utility to contemporary progres-
sives interested in combating the unitary executive.  State-informed
constitutionalism may not be anathema to progressive constitutional-
ism as often thought.
Whatever the merits of interposition, we should remember that
current problems are likely not wholly new and that past generations
fought similar constitutional battles.  Their innovations are useful re-
sources for contemporary constitutional problems.
